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Abstract
As the Church follows the call of John Paul II for a New Evangelization, she must con-
sider how the individual person actually comes to belief. Bl. John Henry Newman, soon 
to be canonized, addressed this question in An Essay in Aid of A Grammar of Assent. Ac-
cording to Newman, religious belief is not just a logical acceptance of intellectual propo-
sitions. It is a commitment of the whole person to God, according to the image of God 
formed in the person’s imagination. (The imagination is that faculty possessed by every 
human person, which coordinates real life experiences and allows the person to compre-
hend the real world around him).It is by intentionally employing the imagination, rather 
than demonstrative logic, that the human person arrives at a belief that is well-grounded, 
neither cold nor fanatical. Accordingly, our evangelical activity, while never neglecting 
the truth of  the Gospel, should seek to  engage the senses and feelings of  the human 
 person and not merely the intellect.
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The announcement of John Henry Newman’s canonization has caused excite-
ment among many groups within the Catholic Church. English Catholics, con-
verts to Catholicism, and Oratorians rejoice that one of their heroes is being 
elevated to the altar. For the rest of the Church, who may not know him as well, 
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Newman’s canonization offers an opportunity to examine the body of his work 
and consider its relevance for our own day.
We are all aware that this Third Millennium of Christianity is marked 
by scandal, but we also know that it was begun with great hope. Pope John Paul 
II, no stranger to trials and difficulties, foresaw a great “springtime of evangeliza-
tion,” which would transform Catholic Christianity and the world. He believed 
our Church would come to life, and pointed us toward our most essential work: 
the proclamation of the Gospel to all the nations.
For our Church to come to life corporately, however, it would be wise for 
us to consider how we come to belief individually. Indeed, on this topic John 
Henry Newman has quite a  lot to share. In Newman’s day, post-reformation 
apologetics still thrived; for many apologists, Divine Revelation was to be be-
lieved especially because of philosophical proofs that preceded the proclamation 
of God’s Word. Newman’s thought on the development of belief was different. 
Instead of abstract, deductive ideas of how the human person ought to arrive 
at belief in God Newman described how the human person actually arrives 
at  belief. He  also explained how the human person could provide a  reason-
able justification for their belief, even if this justification were not a technical, 
philosophical proof.
Considering the importance of an understanding of belief for the work 
of ourtime, I will offer here an explanation of Newman’s phenomenology of be-
lief.Relying especially on Newman’s An Essay in Aid of A Grammar of Assent, 
I will discuss imagination and belief in the writings of Newman and consider 
how his thought can help us to proclaim the Gospel in the 21st century.
1. Imagination in Itself
At the heart of John Henry Newman’s explanation of belief is  the imagina-
tion, that faculty possessed by every human person, which coordinates real 
life experiences and allows the person to comprehend the real world around 
him. To be clear: “imagination” as used by Cardinal Newman does not follow 
the typical definition of “imagination.” Newman’s imagination is not directed 
toward “imaginary” things; it does not construct fantasy worlds that never 
have and never will exist. Rather, the imagination serves to grasp reality as the 
human person perceives it. For Newman, the imagination attempts to make 
sense of the vast amount of data that the person absorbs in his life; it gives the 
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person a sense of order in his experiences and assists him in understanding the 
real world around him.
To offer another point of clarification: “imagination” and “image” also do not 
merely refer to that which is visible.1As John Coulson points out, the use of the 
imagination, as explained by Newman, does not involve a “simple process 
of ‘imaging.’”2Rather, the imagination provides for the human person a means 
to become aware of the state of affairs around himself.3This “state of affairs” 
involves much more than those things which the eyes take in. It includes the 
impressions that the person acquires by means of his senses, his emotions, his 
encounters with other persons, and all the other experiences that affect his life.
As a result, the imagination does not directly contribute to (what philoso-
phers might call) the human person’s “abstract Aristotelian knowledge.”4 The 
imagination does not concern itself with concepts and forms. It does not con-
template generalities, and it does not seek to make formal deductions based 
upon mere ideas. The imagination would not, for example, ponder the abstract 
notion of “a man.” It would, however, be interested in “my nephew Nicholas, 
the son of my sister Catherine” as I have experienced him. It would not attempt 
to piece together a more developed concept of him based on notions such 
as “short in stature,” “strong-willed,” and “32 year-old.” Instead, through real 
life experiences of Nicholas, the imagination would consider the reality of who 
he is in himself and not according to general characteristics that he shares with 
other people.
The example that I have just provided of the use of the imagination shows 
how widespread its application can be. Cardinal Newman did not intend to sug-
gest that the human person uses the imagination for only religious matters; its 
 1 I readily recognize the potential confusion that these terms could cause in this regard, but 
due to the use of “imagination” by Newman himself and the fact that “image” seems to be the 
natural word to use for that which arises from “imagination,” I will use these words throughout 
this thesis.
 2 J. Coulson, Religion and Imagination: In Aid of a Grammar of Assent, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press 1981, 47.
 3 R. Holyer, Religious Certainty and the Imagination: An Interpretation of J.H. Newman, 
“The Thomist” 50, no. 3 (July 1986), 405.
 4 Clearly, Newman would not deny the importance of abstract knowledge. It is by means 
of abstractions, after all, that the human person is able to communicate with those around 
him; the human person relies upon abstractions (or notional apprehensions) from particular 
experiences to communicate thoughts and ideas to those who have similar abstract concepts 
resulting from different concrete experiences.
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use extends to all real apprehensions. A real apprehension “is an imaginative 
grasp of a statement such that what is stated affects the person as though it were 
a reality in which he is involved.”5 It is the intelligent acceptance of the facts 
and realities of a person’s life. By means of real apprehensions, the human per-
son takes in impressions of the world around him in its concrete rather than 
abstract details.6
Nevertheless, Newman had, as a primary motive for his examination of imag-
ination, the justification of the religious act of faith. For those persons possessing 
little or no training in formal philosophical deduction, as well as for those with 
much education in this area, the imagination could be used to consider the 
“state of affairs” regarding the existence of God, the divinity of Jesus of Nazareth, 
and the divine establishment of the Catholic Church. The imagination could 
give the human person an understanding of the reality of these “objects” of his 
experience, as well as that of all the other circumstances of his existence.
2. The Formation of Images
Because the imagination draws its data from concrete experience, the human 
person does not use it in a “neat and tidy” manner. Unlike Aristotelian apprehen-
sion, the human person does not utilize well defined notions to produce perfectly 
ordered conclusions within his imagination. Instead, the human person forms 
images using the real experiences of life, which are seldom perfectly defined, fully 
understood, or absolutely identical with the circumstances and events of those 
of someone else. In his Apologia Pro Vita Sua, Newman offered a personal 
example that can show how the human person forms his own unique images 
based on his own experiences: “Now I come to two other works, which produced 
a deep impression on me in the same Autumn of 1816, when I was fifteen years 
old, each contrary to each, and planting in me the seeds of an intellectual in-
consistency which disabled me for a long course of years. I read Joseph Milner’s 
Church History, and was nothing short of enamoured of the long extracts from 
St. Augustine, St. Ambrose, and the other Fathers which I found there. I read 
them as being the religion of the primitive Christians: but simultaneously with 
 5 R. Holyer, Religious Certainty and the Imagination, 405.
 6 Newman distinguishes his “real apprehensions” from those “notional apprehensions,” 
which comprise knowledge of the more Aristotelian, abstract sort.
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Milner I read Newton on the Prophecies, and in consequence became most 
firmly convinced that the Pope was the Antichrist predicted by Daniel, St. Paul, 
and St. John. My imagination was stained by the effects of this doctrine up to 
the year 1843.”7
Because of the evidences that he had acquired by means of his own reading, 
Newman formed a unique image of the Papacy. Undoubtedly, a devout Catholic 
would have formed a vastly different image of the Pope than did the adolescent 
John Henry Newman, and the Catholic would likely be of the opinion – as would 
Newman as he grew older – that he needed a more thorough exposure to the 
Papacy than Milner and Newton provided. This example illustrates then that 
the human person’s experiences of the world are unique, but also that they can 
be imperfect when taken individually. However precise these experiences may 
be, the imagination acts as the means by which the person coordinates them into 
coherent realities; the imagination synthesizes these evidences and concrete data 
in such a way that the person arrives at an insight into reality that is particular 
to him and that allows him to live his life accordingly.
As previously mentioned, in hearing the word “imagination” we might think 
that this faculty only deals with that which is visible, and we might suppose that 
the only evidence which it takes into consideration is that which the human 
person can see. In fact, the range of evidences extends much more broadly. 
Robert Holyer notes that the real apprehensions, upon which the imagination 
relies are “dependent on our beliefs, our desires, our personalities, our past 
experiences and our knowledge of ourselves, others and the world…But real 
apprehension is not only person-related, it is also facilitated by the use of lan-
guage in specific ways. According to Newman, history, stories, narrative, and 
the description of facts and people’s experiences more readily involve us than 
do concepts, theories, and abstract ideas.”8
Although the human person considers much more than what he can see 
in forming an image in his imagination, Newman does note that much of that 
which the human person learns by way of the stories and anecdotes tend to be 
apprehended in a way that appeals more to the vision than to the other senses. 
The human person can rather easily describe for another person specific physi-
cal appearances, movements, textures, and the like, but he falls short of words 
 7 J.H. Newman, Apologia Pro Vita Sua, New York: W.W. Norton and Company 1968, 18.
 8 R. Holyer, Religious Certainty and the Imagination, 405.
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in describing the reality of sounds or sensations.9Thus, for example, a man can 
rather easily describe the physical appearance of his wife, but a woman would 
have a difficult time describing (at least to a man) the particular pain experi-
enced during childbirth.
Presented with the evidences available to it, the imagination “orders into 
a unique whole the arguments and pieces of evidence which, up to this point, had 
existed as mutually exclusive and isolated in their effect on the mind.”10Sometimes 
the process of forming an image occurs with little difficulty because the person 
has had little experience of a particular person or thing.A student, for instance, 
might form an image of his teacher as unreasonably strict and ill-tempered solely 
on first impressions. Later on, this impression might change due to greater expe-
rience, but after the first day of class, with no other evidence upon which to draw, 
the student has little trouble forming an image of his teacher. Unfortunately, 
in some situations, because of factors outside the control of the human person, 
a limited amount of experience is all that he has for the construction of an im-
age. As a result, he can be left with rather simplistic, distorted images of reality.
Yet, seldom does an image arise from a single piece of evidence. Often the 
human person considers a multitude of diverse experiences in forming an image 
in his imagination, and thus the imagination can exhibit an impressive dexter-
ity in the way that it functions. As an example, Newman noted that those who 
assent to an image of Jesus’ divinity do so based on “various experiences and 
disposing causes, variously combined; such as a warm or strong imagination, 
great sensibility, compunction and horror at sin, frequenting the Mass and other 
rites of the Church, meditating on the contents of the Gospels, familiarity with 
hymns and religious poems, dwelling on the Evidences, parental example and 
instruction, religious friends, strange providences, powerful preaching.”11
From these examples of the limitations and skills of the imagination, we can 
observe how it assists the human person in coming to a greater understanding 
of the realities around him. Beyond descriptions of this sort, however, it becomes 
difficult to speak about the psychological processes that make up its rather mys-
terious work. While we might have a natural curiosity to find an explanation 
of the principles and methods that allow the imagination to function as it does, 
 9 J.H. Newman, An Essay in Aid of A Grammar of Assent, 28.
 10 D.M. Hammond, Imagination in Newman’s Phenomenology of Cognition, “Heythrop 
Journal” 29, no. 1 (January 1988), 27.
 11 J.H. Newman, An Essay in Aid of A Grammar of Assent, 86-87.
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Newman makes it very clear that it does not operate according to the standard-
ized methods of logic and inference of formal philosophy. The functioning of the 
imagination cannot be described by referring to abstract structures found in the 
mind of every human person.
The formation of images is, in fact, a very personal process. Each human 
person comes to an awareness of a particular reality around him in his own way, 
and consequently, the images, which he forms and to which he gives his assent 
are unique as well. Newman himself stated that the images that arise in the 
imagination “are often peculiar and special. They depend on personal experience; 
and the experience of one man is not the experience of another. Real assent, then, 
as the experience which it presupposes, is proper to the individual… It shuts 
itself up, as it were, in its own home, or at least is its own witness and its own 
standard.”12As a result of the personal nature of the processes of the imagina-
tion, each of two persons experiencing the same object will develop his own 
particular image of the object. Each will bring his own personal background 
and dispositions to the consideration of the object, and these considerations 
along with other factors will affect the image that is formed in his imagination.
This does not suggest that two different people, possessing imaginations that 
function differently cannot arrive at the same general conclusions regarding 
an object under consideration. Two people having had dinner together could 
both have an image of having had a very good meal. One person, however, might 
find his primary evidence for this in his enjoyment of their conversation, while 
the other might have been more positively affected by the food itself. As a reli-
gious example of this same phenomenon, Newman pointed out that a number 
of different people may come to realize, through their imaginations, that Jesus 
of Nazareth is God, but each will have arrived at this conclusion by way of dif-
ferent experiences. “In each case the image in the mind, with the experiences 
out of which it is formed would be a personal result; and though the same in all, 
would in each case be so idiosyncratic in its circumstances that it would stand 
by itself, a special formation.”13
Whatever the object may be under examination, then, the individual human 
person in his own way utilizes various evidences to have a unified image in his 
own imagination. Though in abstract terms and descriptions he might agree 
with another person regarding the general form of the object, his experience 
 12 J.H. Newman, An Essay in Aid of A Grammar of Assent, 83-84.
 13 J.H. Newman, An Essay in Aid of A Grammar of Assent, 87.
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of this object in his imagination is decidedly his own. The image that he pos-
sesses is unrepeatable.
4. Imagination’s effect on the Emotions
The imagination, as I have previously observed, functions in such a way that 
it gives the human person a sense of reality as if he were currently experiencing 
it. Being “really” involved in the images in his imagination, the human person 
therefore reacts to them in a real way; his entire person is involved, especially 
his emotions. If, for example, the coherent image presented to him in his imagi-
nation is one that pleases him, he obviously finds himself attracted to it. Those 
images which are unpleasant, even horrifying, can, on the contrary, drive him 
to seek another reality in which he can find greater peace and joy.
The force of attraction or repulsion of these various images directly depends 
on the vividness of the particular image. Fresher and more lucid images elicit 
stronger reactions on  the part of  the human person. A more coherent im-
age will provoke stronger sentiments than will a jumble of facts; those events 
in a person’s life which he has more recently experienced will generate stronger 
reactions than will an incident in the distant past. Newman further observed 
the ability of emotions experienced in the past to perdure in the imagination 
for a longer period than other evidences. The memory of various events in the 
life of a person may fade, he noted, but “the vivid image of certain anxieties 
or deliverances” will never do so.14 Consequently, even though the sights and 
sounds of an event may have long ago departed from the imagination, the feel-
ings of a person may nevertheless be stirred up by those strong feelings of the 
past that may seem to be a present reality.
In considering the emotional effects of the imagination, the difference be-
tween images in the imagination and abstract notions held in the intellect be-
comes especially apparent. Those ideas which the human person holds in a no-
tional way in his intellect do little to produce excitement, while images can 
stimulate feelings in a profound way. A preacher, for example, might speak about 
love in an imaginative or in a notional way and depending on his approach, will 
call forth very different reactions from his congregation. He may speak about 
love as “self-gift” or as “mutual self-donation,” but if the individuals to whom 
 14 J.H. Newman, An Essay in Aid of A Grammar of Assent, 25.
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he is speaking cannot associate these terms with their own personal experiences, 
they will remain unmoved by the preacher’s sermon.If instead, the preacher 
offers examples of love in story form, such as a husband’s devoted care for his 
dying wife, he can inspire feelings in them and encourage greater interest in the 
message he is conveying.
With or without the emotions, Newman acknowledges that the human per-
son can make an act of assent to either an image or a notion,15 but as Robert 
Holyer suggests, in Newman’s thought the emotions have a significant role 
to play in the vitality and certitude of this assent. Holyer states that “the strength 
of conviction produced by arguments that appeal to the imagination is in part 
derived from the strength of the emotions they evoke…the emotions contribute 
to a feeling of certainty by lending a sense of reality to the conclusion of the 
argument.”16
5. Imagination and the Act of Belief
When an assent involves the whole person in this way (and not just their intel-
lect) Newman refers to it as “real assent.” Such an act does not remain impassive 
as if dealing in abstractions, but rather involves all of the human person and 
their reality. Because of this, a mature, real assent requires more than mere 
sentiment as a foundation. Since a real assent can significantly affect the way the 
human person lives his life, he ought to approach it with profound seriousness.
The truth of the object of belief, and not merely the human person’s emotions, 
ought to encourage him to believe. He needs to know not only that the reality 
to which he assents is pleasing to him but also that it is true.
Can the human person actually establish the truth of these images? Ac-
cording to the rules of strict, logical demonstration, no,17 but Newman points 
 15 J.H. Newman, An Essay in Aid of A Grammar of Assent, 185.
 16 R. Holyer, Religious Certainty and the Imagination, 410-411.
 17 Cardinal Newman noted that for the philosopher John Locke “it is not only illogical, 
but immoral to  ‘carry our assent above the evidence that a proposition is  true,’ to have 
‘a surplusage of assurance beyond the degrees of that evidence.’” cf. J.H. Newman, An Essay 
in Aid of A Grammar of Assent, 163. Following Locke’s line of thought, without the use of strict 
demonstration, the imagination cannot provide the foundations for a legitimate act of belief; 
no truth could truly be established in an absolute way from experiences of the concrete world 
because nothing and no one could guarantee that these experiences would always corroborate 
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out that the human person constantly makes assents to truths that are not 
firmly established by demonstrable knowledge. The human person must do so 
in order to live a practical life in this world. Newman notes that like these ev-
eryday assents, acts of religious assent also do not require strict demonstration. 
He further insists that the human person can actually have greater confidence 
in these religious assents than in most everyday assents because of the numerous 
evidences to which the person’s imagination makes appeal. The image of the 
religious reality to which the human person assents often develops over time 
until the person can assent to it as true.
Though mankind has always held in high regard those who have applied 
themselves to intellectual and academic pursuits, Cardinal Newman observed 
that in the comprehensive reality of human experience “man is not a reasoning 
animal; he is a seeing, feeling, contemplating, acting animal.”18 The everyday life 
of the human person, in fact, seldom allows him to express himself as a strictly 
reasoning animal. Before making a decision, he does not normally spend in-
ordinate amounts of time determining if he is making a perfect choice; he very 
rarely has the time to do so. Instead, to be able to live life in a practical way, the 
human person must regularly make assents that have imperfect epistemologi-
cal foundations. Clearly, few of these assents would be labeled as momentous 
decisions; Newman himself labeled assents of this sort as “simple.” In speaking 
of them he states, “A great many of our assents are merely expressions of our 
personal likings, tastes, principles, motives, and opinions.”19
Acts of religious belief, however, fall typically not into the category of the 
“simple,” but into that of the “complex.” The importance of the act of faith, when 
compared with that of more simple assents, suggests that the human person 
ought to approach this type of assent differently. The human person certainly 
cannot approach an act of belief in God in the same way that he decides what 
to eat for dessert; he cannot decide to believe or not to believe in God solely out 
of habit or whim. The act of belief in God, because of the effect that it can have 
on the person’s life, calls for a more thorough process of scrutiny to convince 
the human person of its truth. The human person must appeal to numerous 
that truth. Faith would therefore seem to be an irrational leap beyond the facts that are known 
to the human person.
 18 J.H. Newman, An Essay in Aid of A Grammar of Assent,94.
 19 J.H. Newman, An Essay in Aid of A Grammar of Assent,188.
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evidences, which his imagination constructs into a more complex image for 
him to judge.
I have already spoken about the underpinnings for this process when I dis-
cussed the way in which images form in the imagination. From the evidences 
that are presented to the imagination, the human person is able to form an image 
of the reality to which he assents. As the person is exposed to more and more 
evidences, he becomes more and more aware of the truth of the image in his 
imagination. As his experiences of this reality diversify, not only the general 
form but also the details of the image develop.
In one sense the human person gradually comes to an awareness of the truth 
of his object of assent; as the image’s form and details are completed by real life 
experience, the person becomes increasingly aware of the image’s truth until, 
having been convinced by the image presented to him, he gives his assent to it. 
Yet, the awareness of the truth of this image does not arise from a logical, step-
by-step reasoning from the individual evidences; the awareness of its truth 
comes from a perception of this image as an integral whole, to which details 
may be added. Newman gives the following explanation of this awareness: “…
an object of sense presents itself to our view as one whole, and not in its sepa-
rate details: we take it in, recognize it, and discriminate it from other objects, 
all at once. Such too is the intellectual view we take of the momenta of proof 
for a concrete truth; we grasp the full tale of premises and the conclusion, per 
modumunius – by a sort of instinctive perception of the legitimate conclusion 
in and through the premises, not by a formal juxtaposition of propositions.”20
Cardinal Newman’s phenomenology of belief therefore avoids two signifi-
cant dangers to the act of faith: fideism and rationalism. Undeniably, Newman 
affirms that the human person makes a decision that is not demonstrably sup-
ported by the evidence at hand; when dealing with a concrete reality, the human 
person can never exhaust all the ways in which to experience it. The “leap” that 
his phenomenology proposes, however, is far from the blind leap of fideism; 
the person’s assent is encouraged when he sees the truth of the coherent, albeit 
incomplete, image of the reality under consideration. At the same time, New-
man’s phenomenology, while “reasonable” does not base its reasonability on logi-
cal deduction. He in no way suggests that the human person can make an act 
of belief in Christianity from anything other than his experiences of religious 
 20 J.H. Newman, An Essay in Aid of A Grammar of Assent,301-302.
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realities and revelation; Christianity’s truth cannot be strictly demonstrated 
by philosophy.
Specific examples in our day seem to confirm Newman’s insight into the 
importance of the imagination in making an act of belief. In particular, I would 
like to offer my own experiences of encounters with profoundly convinced con-
verts to Catholicism. When I have spoken with these converts or listened to the 
description of their assent to Catholicism, they have often mentioned a particular 
article of faith that was especially influential in their decisions; the Real Pres-
ence of Christ in the Eucharist has perhaps been the most common motive that 
they have cited. At the same time, I have often heard evaluations by them that 
Catholicism “makes sense” or that it “all fits together.” Comments such as these 
suggest to me that in assenting to the truth of the Catholic Church, converts 
often consider a large amount of evidences in forming the image of Catholi-
cism to which they assent. The zeal with which many converts to Catholicism 
live their lives21 also suggests that for them the truth of the Catholic Church 
is not only an intellectual concern but is something that impacts their lives 
in a concrete way and is something to which they wish to respond. The assent 
which they have made, though it may be very reasonable, is far from logically 
deductive. It is very much real.
When the human person makes a real assent to a religious object, his life does 
not of necessity have to express this. Yet, as the previous example of Catholic 
converts implies, the imagination of the human person often encourages him 
to relate toward an image as if it were a substantial reality; he reacts in a real 
way toward the state of affairs presented by his imagination. This reaction often 
involves the stimulation of the human person’s emotions, and these emotions 
can lead him to live according to his imagination in practical ways.
While it is true that particular images may have no emotional, and therefore 
nopractical effect on a particular person,22 the emotional effect of the imagina-
tion reveals a major difference between notional and real assent in the thought 
of Cardinal Newman. John Coulson points out that “Newman grounds his 
conception of notional and real assent upon this distinction between what might 
be called an armchair nod of assent and the decision to go and do something 
 21 I would like to point out the efforts of former Protestant ministers, such as Dr. Scott 
Hahn and Jeff Cavins, who now dedicate much of their lives in speaking passionately about 
the importance of Catholicism to them.
 22 J.H. Newman, An Essay in Aid of A Grammar of Assent,89.
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about it.”23 Notional assent, dealing with abstract concepts and generalities, does 
not normally inspire the human person to act according to them. Conversely, 
real assent, dealing with images of real objects and experience, can urge the 
human person to respond to his understanding of reality in practical ways. 
As Newman observed, “No one, I say, will die for his own calculations: he dies 
for realities.”24
6. Mistaken Assents to Mistaken Images
In our day and age, however, it has become abundantly clear that those who 
die for realities are not exclusively Christian. The modern day threat of terror-
ism has provided a striking example of how real assents can be made to images 
in the imagination that are vastly different from those of Christianity. The ac-
tions of terrorists (who also carry out their deeds “in the name of God”) differ 
considerably from the actions of the Apostles and martyrs; their actions, when 
contrasted with those of Christian heroes, suggest that real assents can be made 
to mistaken images.
Cardinal Newman, in speaking about real assent does not seem to deny the 
possibility that the human person can make a mistake about the veracity of an 
image in his imagination. He states, “The fact of the distinctness of the images, 
which are required for real assent, is no warrant for the existence of those ob-
jects which those images represent.”25 An image may be distinct to the human 
person because he has had a very limited number of evidences to consider in the 
images formation. In addition, these evidences may be all of the same sort and 
indicate an image that is “black and white,” with few “gray areas.” When the 
human person sees this apparent lack of inconsistency in an image and finds 
his emotions aroused by it, he can very easily offer his assent to it.
This assent to mistaken images is particularly noticeable when the human 
person develops prejudices. The person who holds a prejudice against a par-
ticular person or group does so because he has developed a facile image of that 
person or group. His image is not ambivalent, and therefore his emotional reac-
tion to the image is not ambivalent, either. He does not have enough evidence 
 23 J. Coulson, Religion and Imagination, 46.
 24 J.H. Newman, An Essay in Aid of A Grammar of Assent, 93.
 25 J.H. Newman, An Essay in Aid of A Grammar of Assent, 80-81.
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to arrive at a more precise image of the reality he experiences, but, encouraged 
by his emotions, which lend a sense of reality to the image in his imagination, 
he assents to this mistaken image as true. Newman observes that prejudices are 
“founded upon reports of facts, or on arguments, which will not bear careful 
examination. Such was the disgust felt towards…the Christians of the first cen-
turies, as a secret society, as a conspiracy against the civil power, as a set of mean, 
sordid, despicable fanatics, as monsters reveling in blood and impurity.”26
Rather unfortunately, the Catholic Church of the 21stcentury seems to be 
an object of modern day prejudice as well. It takes little effort to perceive the 
negative light in which the Catholic Church is held by many people in our world. 
Yet, the critiques of the Catholic Church often sound rather simplistic and un-
developed: “The Catholic Church hates women,” “The Catholic Church needs 
to get with the times,” “The Catholic Church hates gays,” “The Catholic Church 
has a repressed view of sex,” and so on. Criticisms such as these suggest that 
those who offer them have not thoroughly examined their image of Catholicism 
and have not considered that a 2,000 year old organization could have a more 
nuanced identity than their image suggests.
It is this examination, or the lack thereof, that John Coulson points to in 
order to indicate the difference between a fanatic and a profoundly convinced 
believer: “The fanatic is so often the man of one idea; illusions do not last.”27 The 
illusions do not last, that is, when subjected to careful study. If the fanatic takes 
time to broaden his experiences of the object under consideration, he can come 
to realize the fuller reality of this object. He can arrive at a calmer, more secure 
awareness of the truth of the image in his imagination, or he can realize that 
he has assented to a mistaken image that needs a radical reformation. He merely 
needs to open himself to an active scrutiny of the image in his imagination.
Yet, many people with mistaken images, do not make an effort to examine 
them. The reasons for this lack of scrutiny depend upon the person. Laziness 
and disinterest certainly seem to affect some. Others are more likely to be influ-
enced by the emotions arising from their imagination. Some of these individuals, 
who might be considered more fanatical, seem already to have been “convinced” 
by their image and do not wish to be “bothered by the facts” of further experi-
ences. Others appear to have been discouraged by their image and feel little 
encouragement to understand it further. Whatever the reason may be, many 
 26 J.H. Newman, An Essay in Aid of A Grammar of Assent, 254-255.
 27 J. Coulson, Religion and Imagination, 68.
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people never take the opportunity to understand the reality around them more 
fully and therefore never come to a certitude either that their perception of real-
ity is true, or that they could arrive at the truth.
7. Certitude
In spite of the many examples of people who have made mistaken assents, Car-
dinal Newman insists that the human person can come to certitude about those 
things in which he believes. In discussing certitude, Newman emphasizes that 
the human person need not appeal to abstract reasoning in order to have a sense 
of security in his real assents. Rather, using the same imagination that led him 
to believe, the human person can assure himself that his assent is not mere 
prejudice; he can investigate the evidences for his belief to reconfirm his assent, 
if necessary he can inquire whether or not he assented to a mistaken image, and 
through a greater and greater accumulation of evidences he can become certain 
of the reality of his belief.
As the images in the imagination encourage the human person to believe, 
so too these same images assist the human person in becoming certain of his 
belief. Unlike simple assent, however, where one piece of evidence can provide 
a simple and attractive image in which to believe, certitude requires a multitude 
of evidences. The human person arrives at certitude “by a conviction growing 
out of a  ‘mass of probabilities,’”28 and as in the process of coming to assent, 
those evidences that convince him are particular to him. Over time, as the 
evidences to support a particular image continue to accumulate, the human 
person becomes more and more certain that he has made a legitimate assent. 
Newman likens the strength in certitude from these various evidences to that 
of a cable which “is made up of a number of separate threads, each feeble, yet 
together as sufficient as an iron rod.”29The person might not be able to provide 
a single, definitive philosophical proof for his assent, but the number of evi-
dences at hand gives him that particular repose of the mind that comes along 
with being certain.30
 28 R. Holyer, Religious Certainty and the Imagination, 409.
 29 A letter of 1864 quoted in Wilfred Ward, The Life of John Henry Cardinal Newman, vol. 
2 (London: Longmans Green, 1912), 43.
 30 J.H. Newman, An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent, 204-205.
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Here we find the fundamental distinction between an assent that is certain 
and one that is mere prejudice. The person who is prejudiced has taken a some-
what limited number of evidences into consideration in forming the image 
to which he assents. The person who is certain of his assent, on the contrary, 
has used a diverse number of experiences to form his image. This contrast 
of prejudice and certitude does not deny that it is hypothetically possible for 
a person to have developed a false image of an object while having spent time 
examining it. Yet, as Newman notes, in the life of the human person, “it is rare 
that what is not true should be so free from every circumstance and token 
of falsity as to create no suspicion in his mind to its disadvantage, no reason 
for suspense of judgment.”31The likelihood for the human person to maintain 
a false image in his imagination after a meticulous examination is rather slim. 
Its continued existence after having been formed seems to result much more 
often from a failure of the human person to evaluate it.
Cardinal Newman does admit that occasionally the human person can be led 
to withdraw a complex assent which is more than mere opinion. Sometimes, 
in spite of the vast amount of evidences that have been coordinated by him, cru-
cial evidence is still lacking to the person; this evidence can be so contradictory 
to the image in the person’s imagination that he needs to withdraw his assent and 
reform his image. Yet, isolated cases of failures in certitude do not, according 
to Newman, require the human person to be suspicious of certitudes in general. 
He states that for the human person “no instances then whatever of mistaken 
certitude are sufficient to constitute a proof, that certitude itself is a perversion 
or extravagance of his nature. We do not dispense with clocks, because from 
time to time they go wrong and tell untruly. A clock, organically considered, 
may be perfect, yet it may require regulating.”32As the human person grows 
and corrects both simple and – less frequently – complex assents, he learns 
to regulate himself; he discovers what has led him to make mistaken assents 
in the past and consequently he is much less likely to commit them in the future.
 31 J.H. Newman, An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent, 196-197.
 32 J.H. Newman, An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent, 233.
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8. Imaginative Evangelization
Cardinal Newman had great confidence in the ability of the imagination to lead 
the human person to belief and certitude in the Christian religion. He held this 
conviction because he had seen it at work in himself and in others. As we con-
sider our need to evangelize in this Third Millennium, then, it would be wise for 
us to consider using those methods and techniques that would most activate the 
imaginations of those whom we wish to lead closer to Christ. The brief examples 
that I will offer are certainly not exhaustive of these methods, but they should 
indicate an important pathway for evangelization in the future.
Our preaching should be descriptive. Abstract Greek philosophy certainly has 
its place, but it is probably not in the pulpit. Jesus spoke in parables, Newman 
would likely argue, because they appealed to the imagination. To understand and 
embrace the Gospel, men and women of our age need vivid examples of how one 
is to live as a follower of Jesus. “Descriptive” does not, however, mean “insub-
stantial.” In recent decades the West has seen a proliferation of books of “homily 
stories” that are not rooted in sound Christian doctrine. The use of such works 
should be admonished not just as an offense to the Christian message but as an 
abuse of the human person’s imagination.
Our churches should be beautiful. Many non-believers people encounter Ca-
tholicism when they attend weddings and funerals of friends or when they explore 
foreign cities; how important it is that these encounters leave them with an image 
of awe and mystery surrounding the worship of the Triune God. Whether a church 
building’s decoration is simple or ornate, it’s order and structure, as well as the 
materials used for its construction, communicate the nature and purpose for its 
existence. A church building made from poor materials, with a design that fosters 
an anthropocentric celebration of the Eucharist, can build within the imagination 
of the inquirer an image of a Church that does not take the Lord seriously. What 
an awful image to construct! As a Church, our buildings consecrated for worship 
should be built with the purpose of building an image of the Lord’s glory and 
majesty; our churches should raise the human person’s mind and heart to God.
The Church should also continue to promote the value of personal testimony. 
When a Catholic (clergy or lay) stands up and speaks of what Jesus has done for 
them, the Christian message ceases to be abstract. There is a profound difference 
between “Jesus heals” and “Jesus healed me.” The second of these phrases sparks 
the imagination; a person receiving this witness can see that Jesus really works 
here and today and not just in some theoretical place and time.
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As a Church, we must engage in charitable action. Though most likely not 
spoken by St. Francis of Assisi, this saying still has merit: “Preach the Gospel, and 
if necessary, use words.” Men and women of our day, having seen the anti-witness 
of abuse within the Catholic Church, need to encounter Catholics who care for the 
poor, the weak and the marginalized. They need to see that the message of Christ 
can be lived and actually is lived. They need their imaginations filled with concrete 
examples of holy believers, so that they too can be converted and really believe.
Finally, we must constantly bring to the world’s attention the lives of the saints. 
George Weigel referred to Pope John Paul II as a “Witness to Hope,” and so he 
was. In his own life, he experienced the Holy Spirit at work – even in moments 
of difficulty and trial. Because of that experience, he canonized many others who 
had been guided through life by the Lord. Our age especially needs to recall that 
these were men and women of flesh and blood, who, inspired by the Lord, lived 
heroic lives. We need to remember their wisdom, their charitable deeds, and 
their struggles to be converted. For us to believe that we can be saints, we need 
our imagination engaged by the examples of men and women who already are 
saints. For our purposes, then, what better place to start than John Henry New-
man and the man who declared him “venerable,” John Paul II.
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